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Capability and Intent
Western security analysts have long predicted the rampant 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. With few exceptions, these experts
have warned that the risk of a global holocaust will increase with such
€
a spread. 1 More recently a second voice has been gaining strength in the 
discussion* perhaps proliferation is not such a threat, and
international stability may actually be enhanoed by the process.' it is 
doubtful tnat the Reagan administration believes American interests will 
not suffer from the spread of nuclear weapons, yet U.S.
nonproliferation policy has been subordinated to other goals (i.e. 
containing the "communist threat"). With subtle tolerance for selective 
proliferation, the current administration has undermined both the 
country's laws and the credibility of its anti-proliferation stance. In 
light of these disturbing events, it is time for a reassessment of U.S. 
ability, and its Interest, in preventing proliferation.
After presenting a brief overview of U.S. nonproliferation efforts 
to date, this paper focuses on actual U.S. ability to contain the 
spread of nuclear weapons. Two basic categories of proliferation 
control are considered* technological constraints and behavior
modification. Evolving nuolear systems are analaysed in chronological 
order, highlighting the extent to whioh eaoh is "proliferation prone."
U.S. Non prolife ration Policy *
2Special attention ia paid t o  t h e  availability and accessibility of 
resources needed for each M eth od . The policy suggestions that are 
reviewed center upon controlling these resources and encouraging 
alternative energy cycles.
Behavior modification techniques are suggested based on an 
interpretation of non-nuclear weapon states' perceptions. Two 
motivational forces discussed are security and prestige. Presumeably 
the degree to which each of these variables are present comprises a 
given state's incentive to obtain a weapons capability. This is 
fundamental in determining both the number of policy options available» 
and, to a certain extent, the success or failure of U.S. efforts. The 
alternative policy options examined include a wide range of political, 
economic , and military Incentives and disincentives.
After having pointed out the limits to American policy options and 
influence, the second portion of this study deals with actual U.S. 
interests in preventing proliferation. Is a world of nuclear powers 
necessarily unstable? Is such a scenario inevitable, and, if so, would 
U.S. interests be best served through cooperation with new members of 
the nuclear club? Could U.S. Influence actually be strengthened by 
selective support for nuclear clients? These questions naturally lead 
into a comparative analysis of the various policy options which have 
been circulated. The conclusion will attempt to relate the first 
sections of the paper to suggestions for a comprehensive U.S. policy.
3Historical Trends
Ever since the advent of nuolear weapons, attempts have been made 
to control their spread. The United States initiated this crusade and 
remains at Its front today. In the 1960's the Soviet Union joined 
international nonproliferation efforts, yet the technology and resources 
needed for a nuclear program have continued to disseminate throughout 
the international system. While nuclear technologies have become more 
readibly available, a diffusion of world power has created the incentive 
for more states to seek a weapons capability. The evolution of U.S. 
nonproliferation policy has coincided with these trends, and to date oan 
be divided into at least four distinct eras.
19*16-1953
Immediately after World War IX, U.S* policy was based on the 
belief that total American domination of the "nuclear genie" could 
continue. Even the allies who had worked on the Manhattan Projeot were 
excluded from the previously Joint effort in atomic research. This 
denial policy led directly to the decision in Britain and Prance to 
pursue independent nuclear programs.
Realising the fine line between peaceful and military applications 
of nuclear power, the United States proposed a series of domestic and 
international safeguard programs. Most prominent among these 
suggestions was the Baruch Plan. The Baruoh Plan called for the 
internationalization of the nuclear fuel cyclej centralization of atomic 
research and development! licensing, safeguarding, and oversight 
measures for domestic programs! and the abolishment and prohibition of
atonic weapon stockpiles* These duties were to be carried out under the 
auspices of the United Nations by the International Atonic Development 
Authority (IADA).
The major reason the Baruch Plan failed was It did not receive
Soviet support. To Soviet Isadora the proposal reeked of American
efforts to build western dominance over a key resource in future Soviet
■a
economic and military planning* These fears were reinforoed by Amerioan 
demands for the elimination (in the nuclear case only) of the veto power 
usually granted to members of the United Nations Security Council
h
(UNSC). Instead the Soviets called for the destruction of all existing 
nuclear stockpiles, and then the creation of an international authority.
The superpower stalemate continued, and no Joint efforts were tabled to 
prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons*
1954-1967
Beginning with the Eisenhower administration the U.S. secrecy 
policy began to mellow. After Britain's 1952 test of a nuolear device, 
the United States realized it could not control the spread of nuclear 
weapons through a monopoly over technology alone* Therefore, President 
Elsenhower's 1953 "atoms for peace” program offered access to both the 
technology and fissionable materials needed by countries seeking to 
develop their domestic nuclear energy programs. In exchange for this 
assistance, recipient states would be subject to safeguards against the 
use of transferred materials for military purposes. The logic behind 
this program was that any state dedicated to developing a nuclear 
capability could overoome the technological barriers, and so it was in 
American best interest to maintain a degree of control over independent
\
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5programs through cooperation. The result of "atoms for peace" was the 
establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The IAEA was granted the dual mandate of promoting the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy, while also reinforcing international safeguards. A 
notable difference between the IAEA and the Baruch Plan is that the
former could only detect agreement violations, and it has no power to 
punish offenders. The IAEA proposal appeared more palatable to the 
Soviet Union, and in 1963 it dropped its objection to International 
controls and joined the U.S. nonproliferation efforts (this decision 
was also facilitated by the Sino-Soviet split, and the subsequent 
Chinese pursuit of a nuclear arsenal which was to yield its first 
successful test in 1964),
During this era the United States also tried to stave off the
growth of independent nuclear arsenals. Between 1960 and 1965 various 
methods were investigated which would have provided the West European
allies with nuclear weapons on a lease-out basis. The French and
British flatly rejected the idea of multi-lateral forces (HLF) and 
continued to pursue their own military programs. By 1967 the United 
States had abandoned the MLF idea altogether ^
1967-1973
The 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) ha3 become the cornerstone 
of the anti-proliferation regime, and at its signing highlighted the 
growing international consensus on the dangers presented by nuclear 
weapons. At the same time, however, nonnuclear weapon states realized 
the potential for secure energy supplies that the atom presented. The 
NPT offered an agreement between the weapon "haves and have-nots" that
67
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be shared equally* 
Accordingly, the Treaty provides that nuclear weapons states agree not 
to transfer nuclear explosives to nonweapons states, not to help any 
state with the development of a nuclear arsenal, to place all nuclear 
exports under safegUL. is, and to faithfully pursue arms control 
agreements. The nonweapons states agreed not to achieve a weapons 
capability and to subject all of their nuclear facilities to IAEA 
standards and safeguards. Nuclear countries eommited themselves to 
aiding non-nuclear countries in their efforts to pursue peaceful nuclear 
technologies.
The major problem with the NPT is that the French and Chinese,
along with prime proliferation candidates (ie. Argentina, Brazil,
India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa) refused to sign It. Besides
wanting to keep their weapons option open, these states often oite
inconsistencies within the Treaty itself which lock nonweapons states
0
into a position of technological and economic inferiority. Other 
incentives exist for a country not to sign the NPT. Recipient countries 
which are signatories must subject all their nolear facilities to 
inspection, while nonsignatories are only subjected to these standards 
on materials supplied by the IAEA, or when such a demand is imposed by 
the exporter country. In essence, a nonsignatory can reap the benefits 
of international cooperation while maintaining a greater degree of 
sovereignty over its national nuclear installations.
During this same time frame the United States pursued policies which 
undermined international efforts to cap the spread of nuclear 
capabilities. President Nixon offered nuclear reactors to Israel and
rEgypt, and began investigating the merits of a plutonium economy. Both 
of these pursuits were seen in the international ceomaunlty as weakening 
U. S. resolve to prevent proliferation at all costs.
1973"* Present
The world energy crisis contributed to a reversal in the period of 
optimism which had yielded the NPT. The search for assured and 
alternative energy supplies increased demands for domestic nuclear 
energy programs, and thus for the weapons states to live up to their 
promises to aid such development. Criticisms emerged over the nuclear 
powers' negligence in meeting their treaty obligations. Specific 
complaints (which continue today) include the failure to sufficiently 
aid the development of peaceful nuclear energy applications, to provide 
NPT signatories preferential access to nuclear exports over non-NPT
signatories, and, more recently, to faithfully pursue arms control
10
negotiations.
Part of the nuclear powers' reluctance to meet the requirements of
11
the NPT arise from the changed technological environment. Two trends 
in the early 1970's changed the nature of the sensitivity of the nuclear 
fuel cycle to potential proliferation. The first of these changes grew 
from perceptions of limited uranium supplies, and therefore the belief 
that alternative processes had to be found to stretch existing supplies. 
Consequently, decision-makers took a renewed Interest In 
breeder-reactors and recycling methods. These processes are discussed 
in more detail below, but for now it is imperative to note they directly 
employ weapons grade material, and therefore raise the risk of possible 
material diversion for proliferation purposes.
9
8Secondly, existing technologies, as well as newer compact and 
coat-efficient methods, had been spread to many more countries, thus 
increasing the number of potential weapons candidates. After receiving 
technical assistance under the Treaty provisions, any oarty may withdraw 
from the agreement upon providing the other signatories with only three 
months' notice. Especially after the 197^ Indian "peaceful nuclear 
explosion" many weapons states feared signatories would cite security 
concerns and exerc.se their right to withdraw, or worst yet, simply 
abrogate the Treaty altogether.
The result of such fears was renewed efforts to control sensitive 
technologies. The NPT watchdog body, the Zangger Committee, produced a 
list of nuclear-related exports whion could not be exchanged without 
IAEA safeguards. Britain, France, Canada, Japan, West Germany, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States founded the London Nuclear
Supplier's Group and developed their own extended export-control
13
list. J The Group's secret meetings in London produced several
14
noteworthy results: France (who has not signed the NPT and is not
bound to Zangger Committee resolutions) agreed to participate in 
multilateral nonproliferation efforts; the Group agreed upon a "trigger 
li31" of nuclear-related goods which could be exported only if the 
recipient country accepted full IAEA safeguards; and they adopted a 
Suppliers' code of conduct designed "to foster genuine commercial 
competition based on quality and prices, untainted by bargaining away 
proliferation controls." The cartel-like nature of the Group, as well 
as the stringent extra-Treaty requirements it imposes (in theory) upon 
potential customers can almost be considered a violation of the Treaty
9itself. Canada, which had previously supplied India with sensitive
technologies and equipment, adopted a policy which called for the review
17
of all outstanding Canadian nuclear export contracts.
The 1974 Indian PNE had a significant impact on U.S. policy as
well. Environmentalists and anti-proliferation lobbies gained support
in the U.S. Congress, and the Arras Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) succeeded in pushing nonproliferation policy to the front of
Gerald Ford's agenda. In October 1976 the President announced the U.S.
would de-empasixe plutonium recycling, and that all existing nuclear
13
agreements with other countries would be subject to review. Under
Jimmy Carter the United States adopted an even tougher unilateral
stance. In 1978 Congress passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
(NNPA). This law placed restrictions on the export of U.S. nuclear
materials or technology: any recipient country must agree to place all
of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and ti.s. assistance
would be suspended to any state which tested a nuclear device.
According to the NNPA, the President may by-pass the required full-scope
safeguards, but a waiver is subject to Congressional approval.
The Reagan administration has continued to pay lip-aervice to tight
technology and resource controls, but realises that nuclear importers
can fill their needs from other sources. Akin to the Elsenhower days,
Reagan has attempted to enhance the American reputation as a reliable
supplier, and to thus maintain some Influence over prime proliferation
candidates. In some cases the Administration has actually arranged for
transfers to non-NPT signatories via a third party, 7 "creating
20
loopholes for new friends and writing blank checks for old ones."
16
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While Mr. Reagan's political tactics are questionable, his assumption 
that the U.S. can no longer directly prevent (and must now seek to 
manage) proliferation may be correct. To judge this position one must 
first understand the political and technical constraints on 
proliferation, and to what extent the U.S. can control them.
Nuclear Technology
Any assessment of the technological constraints to nuclear 
proliferation must naturally begin with a basic understanding of the 
processes being discussed." The key proesses are part of the nuclear 
fuel cycle; we will trace its evolution to the present "ttate of the 
art.” Emphasis will be placed upon the susceptibility of each of the 
technological processes to covert or overt abuse and, consequently, the 
feasibility of conversion to a weapons production facility.
Fundamental Concepts
An atom is the basic building block of all chemical elements. The 
central portion of the atom is called the nucleus and contains both 
protons and neutrons. Together, these particles account for an 
element's atomic weight. The atomic number is always equal to the 
number of protons in the nucleus. All elements with the same atomic 
number therefore contain the same number of protons, but not necessarily 
the 3ame quantity of neutrons. This difference produces atoms of the 
same element with varying weights, (Isotopes).
Nuclear energy and weapons can be created by either of two 
processes of atomic motion: fusion or fission. Fusion occurs when two 
lighter nuclei form a heavier one (this is the principle employed in
11
constructing a hydrogen boob). Fission occurs when a nucleus Is 
bombarded by neutrons, causing it to split. The separation emits heat, 
radiation, and more neutrons. When these newly-released neutrons 
collide with other nuclei, the process is repeated over and over in a 
chain reaction. Nuclear energy is produced in reactors by controlled 
fission.
Materials and Design
Fissionable materials can be either fertile or fissile. Fertile 
atoms include uranium-233 (U—233) and thorium-232 (Th-232), and must be 
struck by high- velocity neutrons to cause a nuclear reaction. Fissile 
materials (0-233, U-235 and plutonium-239 or Pu-239) will react with
high or low energy neutrons. This difference in nuclear properties is 
due to the varying weights of the isotopes. 0-233 and Th-232 are found 
naturally, as is 0-235 (although not in a pure form), while 0-233 and 
Pu-239 must be derived from the fertile materials (either by enrichment 
or breeding).
Critical mass is the minimal amount of fissile material needed to
?2
sustain a reaction. The mass varies according to the Isotope present, 
its concentration and chemical form, the geometrical arrangement of the 
material, and its density. Because a sphere has the highest volume- 
to-surface ratio, it ha3 the least neutrons escape per unit, and it is 
thus the shape for which the smallest critical mass is needed. A shield 
may be used to capture escaping neutrons and reflect them baok against 
the mass, thereby further reducing the neoessary amount of fissile 
material.^
12
The two simplest trigger mechanisms for a fission bomb are the gun 
and implosion devices. A gun device requires two units of subcritical 
mass which are forced together by a chemical reaction to create one 
piece of highly critical material. This design is considered to be 
relatively simple and reliable, and it would therefore not necessarily 
have to be tested before its actual use.
An implosive device Is more complex than a gun mechanism. Fissile 
material is shaped Into a sphere and surrounded by a conventional 
explosive. When the conventional explosive is detonated, a shock wave 
is sent through the subcritical mass, causing it to oondenae and become 
supercritical.
Reactors
Although there are many designs for nuclear power plants, there are
Oil
general components which all reactors must have.' The core is the 
central element which contains the nuclear fuel and is the area where 
fission occurs. Fuel may consist of a critical mass of natural, low- or 
high-enriohed uraniumj U-233 (produced from thorium-232)f or plutonium. 
A moderator of graphite, heavy water, or regular water surrounds the 
core to slow neutrons, and makes them more readily absorbed by the 
fissile material. A coolant (regular or heavy water, liquid metal, or 
gas) circulates through the reaotor to remove or transfer heat. Control 
elements are neutron-absorbing materials which manage the rate of 
fission. All of the above described components are encased within a 
reaotor vessel, which isolates the radioactive portions of the system.
Today it is a generally aocepted belief that the basic
understanding of nuclear physics and weapons design necessary for a
13
modest nuclear arsenal Is readily available in unclassified materials. 
American college students have developed workable designs based upon 
information from such sources. Experts agree that countries with a
25
semi-industrial capability could build effecient systems. The main 
technical barrier to a nuclear arsenal remains the acquisition of a 
sufficient amount of fissile material.
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Weapons grade material becomes available at different stages of the 
nuclear fuel cycle, depending on the type of fuel, enrichment process, 
and reactor being used* It is these variations which determine a 
particular system's vulnerability to proliferation. Regardless of the 
method being employed, however, all potential weapon? material must pass 
through a series of stages which can be described as the "generic 
nuclear fuel cycle" (See figure 1). The front end of this process is 
resource production and Includes the raining, milling, conversion 
enrichment, and fabrication steps. The treated material then undergoes 
irradiation (fuel burnup) before entering the back end of the 
cycle— spent fuel storage, reprocessing, and waste disposal.
Mining, Milling^ and Conversion
The primary energy source for all commercial reactors and most 
research and development reactors is U-235, the only naturally ocouring 
fissile isotope. It is found in natural uranium ore whloh consists of 
approximately 99*3 percent U-238 and 0«? percent U-235. Major uranium 
reserves can be found in Australia, Canada, France, Niger, South Africa,
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the Soviet Union, and the United States. Until recently, the economic 
Incentives to explore global reserves have been minimal, so current 
estimates of total uranium supplies are incomplete.^
Like coal, uranium is mined using open pit and deep-shaft 
techniques. It is then chemically and mechanically processed (milled) 
to obtain a concentrate of approximately 80 percent uranium oxide 
<U3 Oqj This material (called yellowcake) i3 then shipped to a 
conversion plant, where it Is transformed into either uranium metal, 
uranium oxide, or uranium hexaflouride (UF^ The type of reactor to be 
employed determines the conversion process undertaken.
Enrichment
Before being used in most reactors, U-235 must be enriohed above 
its natural state of 0.7 percent. Light-water reactors require low- 
enriched uranium (LEU— between 2-4 percent), while high temperature gas 
reactors and nuclear-powered ships require high-enriched uranium (HEU—  
90 percent), or weapons grade material. The four current methods for 
enrichment are gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, aerodynamic (nozzle), 
and laser.
Gaseous diffusion was developed during the Manhattan Project, and
28
is responsible for most enriched uranium to date. Uranium hexaflouride
(UF^ is pumped rapidly through a pourous barrier. The heavier U-238
molecules cannot pass through as quickly as the U-235, and the two
isotopes are separated. The amount of enrichment aohlevad by passing
through one barrier is minimal, and the prooess must be repeated
approximately 1250 times to obtain 3-pereent U-235 (reactor grade), and
29
4000 times to obtain 90 percent U-235 (weapons grade).
15
Diffusion is a very costly technique due to the large amount of
energy needed to force the UF^ through the filters* To convert a
diffusion power plant to a weapons facility would require an
inconvenient and time consuming insertion of additional barriers or
stages* A substantial manufacturing capability would also be needed to
overcome what some experts suggest is the most difficult technical
30
obstacle: the developemment of a suitable barrier material. Because of 
its high cost, large size, and power requirements! such a plant would be 
difficult to build secretly. The greatest proliferation risk of gaseous 
diffusion would be IT it were used to produce HEU as fuel for 
high-temperature gas reactors (HTGRs). The system could then be 
susceptible to diversion or sabotage of weapons grade material.
In recent yearst advancements have been made which may lead to less
costly enrichment methods* The gas centrifuge process is now being used
commercially! and at a cost of about 4 to 10 percent less than the total
cost for gaseous diffusion.^ 1 Like diffusion, centrifuges also depend on
the differences in isotope weights for separation. UF^ is spun rapidly
in a rotor, creating a oentrifugal force which causes the U-235 to
concentrate along the outer wall. Besides being smaller and more
efficient than diffusion, centrifuge needs fewer stages (perhaps only
32
35) to produce 90 percent U-235. In addition, this method requires 
less power and technical knowledge, although a higher ability to 
manufacture precision equipment Is necessary. It is more easily 
adaptable to a weapons facility. As with diffusion, the greatest 
proliferation threat is the diversion of HEU Intended for use in HTORs.
16
The same characteristics which make gas centrifuge appealing for power 
purposes make it appealing for a weapons program.
Several types of aerodynamic techniques have been developed 
recently. The best known of these is the "jet" or "Becker" nozzle, 
which was designed in West Germany. A mixture of UF^ and hydrogen or
helium is forced over a curved surface at high speeds, separating the
Isotopes as they round the bend. A similar method known as the Helikon 
process has reportedly been used commercially in South Africa, but the 
authorities within that country have refused to release details. A
semi-commercial South African nuclear plant incorporating this method is 
schedule^ Tor start-up in 1987.
Both the Helikon and Becker methods require less manufacturing 
capability and economic investment than either the centrifuge or the 
diffusion process. They also demand fewer stages than diffusion to
achieve 3 percent (600 stages) and 90 percent (2000 stages)
qii
U-235. To convert either of the aerodynamic facilities into a weapons 
production facility would require installing more stages (the 
translation in this case is easier than for diffusion)• The drawback to 
these methods is the enormous amount of power necessary to compress the 
gaseous mixture. An aerodynamic enrichment program would be attractive 
to countries where power is cheap and the technical skills nesded for 
diffusion or centrifuge are not available. Its large power requirements 
make aerodynamic enrichment inferior to centrifuge, but its flexible 
adaptability (for countries wishing to keep their weapons option open) 
makes it superior to diffusion.
17
A fourth enrichment process, the laser, is still In the research
and developeraent stages. The principle behind this method is that the
different isotopes will absorb varying frequencies of light and become
"excited". 3y using a finely tuned laser, /en isotopes may be
selected from a gaseous mixture and then separated. Using this method,
high-enriched uranium may be produced in only one step, and with a
35relatively small energy input. The high separation power will also 
reduce the amount o f U-235 not recovered from the natural uranium ore.
Laser enrichmant may pose a threat to nonproliferation because it 
ha3 the potential to speed up production of weapons grade material, yet 
experts agree that the technical skills needed to harness this method 
are well beyond the reach of subnational groups, as well is most 
countries.^ In contrast, the efficiency of the method may actually slow 
the proliferation process by creating larger recovered uranium supplies, 
thus reducing the incentive to explore breeder reactors or new 
reprocessing technologies which may prove to be more threatening to 
nonproliferation efforts.
Fabrication
The final step before irradiation takes place is the formation of 
fuel elements. Uranium dioxide (UO^ is compacted into small pellets 
which are then stacked in metal tubes. Together a bundle of these fuel 
rods form an element. When recycled plutonium is used with uranium, 
plutonium oxide powder is mixed with uranium oxide powder before shaping 
the pellets. The presence of this pure plutonium oompound makes any 
uranium-plutonium fabricating facility a target for diversion. This 
risk is increased if the plant is not located near a reprocessing center
18
and the material must be shipped. One method of reducing the 
susceptibility of fuel rods to diversion i3 called "spiking."J By 
mixing radioactive substances with the plutonium, the fuel elements 
become more difficult to handle without proper tools. This same
precaution generates new accident hazards for transporting the rods. 
Irradiation
Nuclear power is produced within a reactor. Energy production 
requires fuel burn-up, and the kind of reactor being operated determines 
the amount and type of waste emitted by this process. During 
irradiation, U-238 is converted to Pu-239 by the capturing of neutrons. 
A continuation of this procedure creates Pu-240, which is a lesser 
quality weapons material. The relative concentration of Pu-24Q always 
increases over time, and therefore the longer the burn-up time of a 
particular reactor, the less weapons-grade material is left
remaining.^®
There are at least two basic ways to classify reactors. One
method is by their conversion ratio, or the amount of fissile material
they produce relative to the amount they consume. A "burner" uses much
more material than is produced, and therefore has a low conversion
ratio. "Converters" are reactors where the production/consumption ratio
nears one, while "breeders" have a ratio greater than one. Reactors
with higher conversion ratios generally operate more efficiently than 
40
the others.
Another useful way to categorize reactors is by their coolant 
and/or moderator. There are four basic types of reactors under 
development or in use today: light-water, heavy-water, high-temperature
19
gas-cooled, and breeders*
Light-water reactors are the dominant reactors in the nuclear 
industry today. The category can be further broken down into
pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) and boiling-water reactors (BWRs). 
When analyzing the potential effects various LWRs may have on 
proliferation, there is virtually no difference in the two types. Each 
relies on low-enriched uranium (although purity may vary by 2-3 percent) 
which must be reprocessed to become weapons grade. Likewise, the 
plutonium produced would need to be reprocessed if intended as an 
explosive material. A nation wishing to pursue a weapons path could 
reduce burn-up time of its reactor and recover enough plutonium to
a i
manufacture a crude device. This same plutonium would be less 
appealing to subnational groups because of Its high radioactivity.
LWRs must be shut down approximately once a year for refueling. 
The process takes four to six weeks, during which time the oore oools 
and one third of the fuel is replaoed. Periodic shutdowns are costly in 
terms of power not produced, but they also facilitate on-site 
Inspections and safeguarding.
The pressurized-heavy water reactor (PHWR), produced in Canada, is 
the second most popular reactor design today. Other heavy-water designs 
have been fielded, but the CANDU (Canadian deuterium-uranium reactor) is 
the dominant method employed. Argentina, India, Pakistan, and South 
Korea have all pursued this route.
Heavy-water (deuterium) is regular water with an extra neutron. As 
a moderator it absorbs less neutrons and leaves more available to
20
sustain a chain reaction, and, therefore natural or low-enr! hed uranium 
may be used for fuel. A country employing this method would not require 
enrichment or reprocessing facilities, but it would need an assured 
heavy-water supply.
CANDU reactors may be refueled continuously, thus avoiding costly
shutdown periods. This same benefit makes safeguarding more difficult
to implement. By forcing fuel through the reactor faster than intended,
less irradiation occurs, and higher grade plutonium can be produced.
Recent attempts to improve material accountancy have been promising, and
experts are confident that a method can be developed whereby "repeated
covert diversion of fuel assemblies cannot take plaoe undetected during
42
either normal or accelerated refueling."
West Germany has become the guardian of the high-temperature gas* 
cooled reaotor (HTGR). Of the pilot programs launched in Great Britain, 
the United States, and West Germany, the latter is the only one still in 
operation. HTGRs incorporate a graphite moderator, a helium ooolant, 
and high-enriched uranium fuel to create high temperatures which then 
propel gas turbines and produce energy. The benefits of this method 
include less safety risk, a high conversion ratio, and a more efficient 
use of uranium.
The obvious hazard with HTGRs in terms of proliferation risk is the
direct utilization of high-enriched uranium as a fuel. After
fabrication, however, material diversion would be very difficult because
the fuel pellets are coated with silioon carbide, whioh can only be
4 4
removed by smashing them in a large and complex maohine. Plans are
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also underway to develop a mixed fuel which would be less appealing to 
potential diversion. HTGl must be shutdown to refuel, and their spent 
fuel contains no plutonium.
As explained earlier, breeders are reactors which produce more
fissile material than they consume. Scientists have understood this
technology for over three decades, but it was not pursued because other
methods were considered to be more cost effective or better for a
US
weapons production program. Currently Britain, France, India, Japan, 
the Soviet Union, West Germany, and the United States, all have research 
teams to tap this dormant technology. The renewed interest in breeders 
was spurred during the 1970's by fears of limited uranium supplies, and 
is especially prevalent in the energy dependent European countries and 
Japan.^
Although not yet available commercially, the liquid-metal fast 
breeder (LMBFR) is at a more advanced stage than any other design being 
considered. LHBFRs have a core of Pu-239 whioh is wrapped in a blanket 
of U-238. Fission Is initiated in the core, creating heat energy. The 
heat is transferred by a liquid-gas coolant (sodium) to a water chamber 
where steam is formed.
Although LMFBRs will require plutonium for a start up, that is not
the major problem with this reactor type. Once an LMBFR goes aotive, it
will produce anywhere from 10-40 percent as much fissile material as it
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consumes per year. The abundance of weapons grade plutonium (separated 
from uranium) available at virtually every stage of the cycle will 
increase the possibility of sabotage or diversion. One option to reduce
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this risk entails the use of thorium instead of U-238. Waste products 
would then contain fissile 0*233 rather than Pu-239* LHFBRs must be 
shutdown periodically to replenish the uranium blanket around the core. 
Spent Fuel Storage
After a given period of Irradiation, fuel elements must be removed 
from the reactor because they no longer contain enough fissile material 
to sustain a chain reaction. The fuel becomes depleted and contains 
highly-concentrated radioactive by-products (radioisotopes). Spent fuel 
is both physically and radioactively hot, and it must be stored on site 
for at least 140-180 days. After it has been allowed to cool, waste is 
either permanently disposed of or shipped to a reprocessing plant. 
Reprocessing
Chemical treatment of spent reactor fuel separates the plutonium 
and uranium from the radioaotlve by-produots, as well as from each 
other. The radioaotlve wastes are packaged for long-term storage and 
reusable materials are recovered.
The fuel elements are first dissassembled, and the fuel is 
dissolved in nitric acid. The plutonium and the uranium are removed 
from the solution by the PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Recovery by 
Extraction) process. Similarly, thorium and uranium are extracted by 
THOREX. Next, product purification separates the uranium from the 
plutonium or the thorium. Both the uranium and the plutonium salvaged 
fro these steps may be a sufficient grade for an explosives 
capability.1*®
Waste Disposal
Radioactive wastes are produced throughout the fuel cycle, but
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those which draw the most public attention emerge as spent fuel* These 
wastes must be Isolated from the environment until their radioactivity 
has decayed. Alternative disposal suggestions include embedding the 
waste in chemically stable glass and dumping It In ocean and seabed, 
underground, or outerspace depositories. Currently the U.S. stores its 
spent fuel in pools of water at commercial power facilities. When, and 
if, waste reprocessing begins, one of these disposal alternatives will 
have to be adopted.
Waste disposal poses very little threat to nonproliferation. The 
materials Involved are highly radioactive, and even if they were stolen 
or diverted they would still require reprocessing before an explosive 
oould be manufactured.
Comparative Assessment of Alternative Fuel Cyoles
The brief overview provided above illustrates the strengths and 
weaknesses of varying aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (see summary 
tables 1 and 2). Each component has its strong points—  cost-efficient, 
proliferation-resistant, or self-contained to assure independence. 
Political, economic, and technological constraints force policy planners 
to weigh trade-offs and chose between the different costs and benefits. 
Likewise, they must decide how the various components will be arranged—  
in a once through or dosed fuel cycle.
The major difference between a onoe-through and closed fuel cyole 
is that, in the former, fuel is introduced into the system once and the 
waste is then discarded. In the latter, waste products are recycled and
Ta b le
Enrichment
Required
ConnKirfs o r  o
Fissile On/off Reprocessing 
®wn-up Content o f Pu Power Needed/
wwd/te in Spent Fuel Fuelling Useful Availability and Q uality of Weapons Material
- J  1 r 1 ons f o r  P r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  V ir_ io u s  R e a c to r  Ty p es _________
Light Water 
Reactor (no Pu
recycle)
LWR (Pu
Recycle)
C'AN D U  Reactor
High-temperature 
Gas Reactor
Liquid-metal 
l ast Breeder
Gas-cooled
Reactor
Advanced Gas 
Reactor
Steam generated 
Heavy Water 
Reactor
Low *6-28.000 
for rwr
?4 33.oooi*wr
70%  or higher Off No/Yes W ith reprocessing, plutonium is available; its quality for 
weapons purposes could be made very good by operating 
with very low burn-up; enrichment facility could be used 
to  produce wcapons-grade uranium
Low 25.000 About 5 5 °, O ff Yes Plutonium is reasonably good after one cycle through 
the reactor; after move than one cycle it is quite poor
None 7-to.ooo About 70 ", On No/Yes W ith reprocessing, plutonium available from  commercial 
when U prices operations is o f roughly same quality as from lw r. Much 
rise better quality plutonium can he made at considerable 
econom ic cost
High 95.000 No Pu O ff Yes U-235 93*- going in; very good, but difficult to remove 
from triso particles; thorium -uranium  reprocessing 
stream yields uranium that is usable with difficulty at 
equilibrium but better after one pass
None 65-IOO.OOO 73/ io n  
average; over 
90% from 
blanket
Off Yes Plutonium mixed together is reasonably good; blanket 
heki separate is very good
None 3 5.000 Very high On No/Yes Plutonium in spent fuel is good to excellent qualify
Low 18.000 About same 
as LW R
On No/Yes Plutonium in spent fuel is about same quality as lw r ; 
enrichment facility could be used to produce weapons- 
grade uranium
Low 21.000 About same 
as lw r
Off No/Yes Plutonium in spent fuel is about same quality as lw r ; 
enrichment facility could be used to produce weapons- 
gradc uranium
Source: Ted Greenwood, George W. Rath jens and Jack Ruina, "J iu d ea r Power and Weapons P r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  
'VIM-IeML ?®per, no. 130 (1 9 7 6 ), p. 16.
Xablu 2. Corner<m n o t A1tcrna1 1 vo ?*.nrichniMit IVchnulunifs______ _
Diffusion Centrifuge Aerodynamic User
Stile  of in
Requirements 
for production
S t i f f *  required in 
ideal cascade (0.3% tails)
3% enrichment
90% enrichment
Suitability for a nuclear 
power fuel cycle
Adaptability of facilities 
developed for a power 
program (enrichment to 
2*3%) to weapons pro* 
duction
Suitability for a small or 
modest deliberate 
weapons program
Possibility of diversion of 
materials from power 
program to weapons 
construction
Mature technology, 
proven m large-scale 
production, barrier 
technology classified
Knowledge of barrier 
technology needed, 
requires large-scale 
production of pumps
1086
3731
Not likely to be economi­
cally competitive for 
small or modest programs, 
and may not be competi­
tive at all if pilot plant 
experience with other 
methods is satisfactory
Least desirable, requires 
construction of additional 
stages, or batch process­
ing, which would be in­
convenient and time- 
consuming because of 
large cascade inventory 
of gas
Unattractive because of 
large number of stages 
required: experience is 
with plants that are of 
large capacity
At the first stage of indus­
trial application, substan­
tial growth potential, 
some details of tech­
nology classified
Mass production of 
precision equipment
10
IS
W ill probably be pre­
ferred (lasers excepted) 
where power costs are 
very high
Much preferred to d iffu­
sion or aerodynamic 
processes because of 
possibility of increasing 
the number of stages by 
changing plumbing 
connections
Very good; several plants 
are now operating or 
planned of a scale inter­
esting for weapons 
purposes
Technology thoroughly 
demonstrated, small 
capacity plants are under 
construction, substantial 
growth potential Seeker 
noa/le technology in the 
public domain. South 
African process 
classified
Some precision machin­
ing capability needed, 
overall, requirements 
probably lest than for d if­
fusion or centrifuge
600
2000
W ill probably be pre­
ferred (lasers excepted) 
where power costs are 
low, especially for small- 
or modest-scale opera­
tions
W ill require additional 
stages, or batch 
processing
Unattractive compared to 
centrifuge but probably 
better than diffusion, 
especially considering 
greater feasibility of 
batch processing
Technology in the mten. 
sive RAD phase with em­
phasis on laser develop­
ment and fundamental 
process physics. Separa­
tion in laboratory re­
ported using U metal and 
Uf«. but commercial 
scale separation probably 
10 years off Some details 
of technology classified
Expert opinion differs <cf 
Greenwood et a l, p 24 
and Lester, p 24). O u t­
standing technical prob­
lem for ML IS process is 
development of suitable 
infrared laser. Other nec­
essary skills and compo­
nents are less demanding 
fo r AVLI5 process, tech­
nical requirements prob­
ably great for corrosive- 
resistant optical surfaces, 
uranium evaporation 
system, and laser itself
Possibly only 1
Possibly only 1
Likely to be particularly 
desirable because it w ill 
probably extend uranium  
supplies greatly
W ill probably be best; 
process may lead 
naturally to highly 
enriched uranium
Probably preferred
Probably most worrisomeNot serious if enrichment is only 2*3" .; serious for all three proc esses if enrichment 
for power purposes is 90-97". ti e., tor HTGR's)
Source Derived in large part tro«- ted Greenwood et at , Nuclear Power and Wt-apuns Proliferation. Adelphi Piper no. 130, W inter 1976. 
pp 23-24. Principal revisions are under the laser heading.
Source: William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, MA: Oeschlager
Cunn, and Haln, Publishers, Inc., 1982), pp. 76-77.
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sent to reprocessing and refabrioation plants, and then reintroduced 
into the system. As a result of their similarities the two methods pose 
the similar threats to nonproliferation, although the closed cycle has 
several unique difficulties.
The Once--Through Cycle
The most common reactors employed for the once-through cycle are
LWRs and HWRs. LWRs must undergo the front end stages of the fuel cycle
(mining, milling, conversion, enriohment, and fabrication), irradiation,
and waste storage or disposal. HWRs undergo virtually the same process,
but the fuel does not need to be enriched.
The major advantage of a once-through system is that weapons grade
material is never directly involved. To utilize material diverted from
this system for a nuclear device would still require enriohment or
reprocessing facilities. Of the two diversion routes, the ohemioal
reprocessing of spent fuel would probably be the easiest and oheapest 
lio
path. HWRs could be used to produce HEU at a reduced energy output 
level. By feeding LEU through the reactor quicker than it was designed 
to be, less Irradiation takes place. The waste produced could be a
CQ
sufficient grade for a crude nuclear weapon, and oould prove hazardous 
to the environment.
The Closed Fuel Cycle
Closed fuel systems face the same weaknesses in the enrichment and 
reprocessing areas as do the once-through systems. In addition, closed 
cycles utilize plutonium directly throughout the process. Plutonium 
could be diverted at almost every stage, but would be particularly 
appealing when purified from other fuels, or when in an easily separable
25
mixture.
Closed fuel systems are of interest to states wishing to maintain 
their weapons option. They also have the economic benefit of less 
reliance on uranium suppliers, thus allowing a greater degree of 
autonomous control.
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Policy Implications
The discussion above underscores a disturbing fact: No
technological constraint in and of Itself is a sure cure for
proliferation. Most fuel cycles and components which are the least
threatening are al30 the least cost-efficient. Any hopes the U.S. 
entertains of persuading other countries to adopt the least 
proliferation prone techniques may have to be accompanied by economic 
and/or political concessions.
In terms of least-risk to the nonproliferation regime the following 
combination of technologies appears the most promising: onoe-through 
cycle, LWR or HWR, gaseous diffusion enrichment. Countries with direct 
access or control over enrichment or reprocessing facilities would have 
an easier task in compiling material for a weapons program. Chemical 
reprocessing is the shorter of the two paths to this end.
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Although the growth in world energy demands is decreasing, the 
appeal of Independent domestic power sources will probably sustain the 
nuclear industry for years to come. The increased availability of new 
and existing technologies will create ever greater challenges for the 
nonproliferation regime. The scope of the problem Is illustrated by 
table 3, which displays the nuclear industrial bases of tewnty-three 
non-nuclear states. In the early 1970's the Soviet Union and several
r.ible t. r'om|>arison of Industrial Bases in Twenty-throe Non-nuclear Weapon States, 1982
Niktear «.apuhility
IIC.IVV iihJc S Isubfe'eUVCl
Nmlear power tM U letP 1 nr*. htiK'nt Hrocde'f Reprocessing Plutonium water leshniv.il ... . . . ---------
State m »*peralioii. Ithl . apae tty development C.lp.lcIfV fuel plans .apae it > ivrsonnel lest 1‘t.ulmc
\i cent ma Ih No No Noi vet" Yes 1 < home 1 (1
Vi.u ilia () No1 No No No No Some It O
Ikdei I' ■ 1 ta*4 Nt Some MmoC Some No ( *i >i >d 1 4)
lit.l/d 0 I t No N o ' Some No S* *11 ie t» 41
t an.tda v 1**4 No N«» No No Some* St tong J 1
t d»*a O No No No No No Sin*. «i ti 41
1 e. pi n No Ne- No No No Minor r> 41
1 K tieimanv s ran. N o f V o M iiioi Yes No Strong > “Y
India K«l** No Yes* Yc> Yes Some C tood 4 1
1; .in tt* No No No V . No Mm* *i n 41
It i(.| it No No No No No Minor it 41
htael ft No No M iiioi No No Strong 4 Y
liah t No home No N< *11K* No Some 1 41
i.tp.**, 11 w i No' Yes Yes Yes No Stiong ’I i
1 !»•..» o No No No No No Slim *i 41 41
Net tiei la>nls sol S»»itie Some* No S«»flK" No Some 1 41
I'at* 1st,nt 1 C No 1 < 1 itkiiown No home 1 it
So.*l tl \t 1 K .I o Some N«* No No No Some * I
S«*ulti k iiea s m No No No N, No Some 1 «i
Spam i No No No No No Some 1 tt
S«e .lee r* 41 s No No No No No C »l h hI Y tt
1 .Il'.V.IIl :  | v# No No No No No Some 1 o
4 ugovl.o. ia O No No No No No Some (» tt
'  V U it r  / h i t m t a t a August l ‘*h?, p V
'  V t iv i t ' i ’u  iu \  j  prototype re p rm e ssin g  p l.m t n c a 'iiig  .  o m p it-I•«.»•«.
V rv 't . i i i  i  in p lann ing to b u ild  an cm K lim e n t p lant.
J Ik l i ' iu m  h <% a p iototvpe re p n v e 'ss in g  p lant that h  at present sh . it  J « w n ,  hut it  may he icnpgncd.
’ I t i . i / i !  u lu in a te h  expects to  gel repr»*eessmg assistance I’ro tn  I  R  i»e im .m > .
I k  i .v i i it a n v  is  active in  I ' r e iu o  e iiiK h iiK -n t  a m l is  p la n n ing  to  b u ild  it s  ow n plant 
" In d ia 's  long-range plan is  to  breed ' T  i io n i  th o r iu m .
* 11 i«, ii. t s  several p a rtia lly  c«*mpleled large n m le a r pow er p la n ts, hot . o iw r t k l io i i  stopped w ith  the re v o lu t io n  
is  p lann ing a large e n iK h m e n i plant It  has a sm a ll e*\|Vi in te rna l plant in  opetuhon.
J.ip .u . i, . is  a w o rk in g  p rototype re p itx c ss ir ig  plant a m i is  p la iuun e  a com m ercia l re p im e ss in g  plant 
l  ( I m ler c o n stim  lio n .
Iruh % ru tin #  w ht m*’ 5 advanced. 4 stro n g . 4 =- nKH le ra ie . 2 som e. I - s lig h t. O none.
Source: SII’RI Y ear book of World Arwaments 1983 (New York: International Publications
Services, Taylor and Francis, Inc., 1983), p. 82.
26
West European states became enriched uranium suppliers* At the same 
time, West Germany challenged the American- and Canadian-dominated 
reactor market by offering Its own light-water reactors for 
international sale. The diverse nature of the goals and actors 
involved will make consensus-building difficult, but it Is a difficulty 
which must be addressed. The point to be made here is that, in terms of 
technological constraints, the U.S. doe3 not have the means to operate 
independently and effectively. Significant policy effectiveness will 
require international cooperation.
Supply-Side Policy Options
Supply-side nonproliferation policies are designed to limit a 
state's physical ability to produce nuclear weapons. Techniques focus 
on preventing the further spread of sensitive technologies, and 
preventing the abuse of those a state may already possess.
Export Controls
Multilateral and unilateral terms of export control such as the 
NPT, LSG, and NNPA have been outlined above. Since 1974 restrictions on 
the sale and transfer of nuclear-related goods and services have been 
strengthened but more effort is needed in the area of "gray market19
cc
materials. These components have legitimate non-nuclear uses, but 
could be included on trigger lists, if only for monitoring purposes.
A second needed measure is the inclusion of more parties (suppliers 
and recipients alike) In export control agreements. States such as 
India, Taiwan, South Africa and Argentina now hold significant 
transferred and indigenous capabilities, Acceptance of this status
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would boost their International prestige (which may be a negative 
factor) and perhaps create the incentive for them to participate in 
multilateral attempts to control the spread of nuclear goods. Even if 
these states remain outside Western spheres of export controls, they may 
initiate their own "supplier groups" or bilateral restrictions. 
Existing export control groups can strengthen this trend by agreeing to 
allow "third tier" countries to act as middlemen in nuclear transfers, 
as long as the new recipient state meets the requirements of the initial 
supplier's transfer code of conduct guidelines.
Safeguards
The core of today's multilateral safeguards is enshrined in the HPT
and carried out under the auspices of the IAEA. The inspection of
nuclear sites and material accountancy are designed to limit covert
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theft or diversion, and are estimated to be 99 percent accurate. The 
IAEA has no authority to recover missing materials or to punish 
agreement violators.
Originally IAEA safeguards were adopted on a piecemeal basis, where 
a country could chose to accept inspections on all the components of 
its fuel cycle, or simply on those portions which it imported. The NPT, 
however, requires nonweapon signatories to subject all of their nuclear 
facilities to safeguarding measuures. The weapons states maintain their 
freedom in deciding whether or not to submit to voluntary safeguards. A 
reversal of this safeguarding bias may increase the willingness of more 
parties to Join the NPT.
IAEA standards may be sufficient to discover the diversion of 
weapons grade material (although one percent inefficiency may be all a
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terrorist group or a state needs for a covert weapons program), it could 
not prevent certain states from undergoing a crash program and 
developing a weapons capability within days* The MPT actually
facilitates this process by spreading nuclear technology, yet allowing 
states a legal escape clause from the agreement. Although the current 
safeguard system is obviously imperfect, It is a step towards
International consensus building. Improved monitoring techniques and 
Increased agreement on technology development and dispersion may 
strengthen this regime in the future. Until this consensus can be 
reached, international safeguards can be strengthened through bilateral 
restrictions on transferred goods, or group guidelines suoh as those 
issued by the LSQ.
Internationalisation
Internationalisation‘S  (or multinationalization) of the moat 
proliferation-prone aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment, 
fabrication, reprocessing, and waste disposal) would remove sensitive 
processes from under direct national control. This action could provide 
cheaper and more seoure on-site storage for weapons grade materials. 
Although on-site seourity risks may deorease, potential risks of 
diversion by subnational (or cloaked state?) theft during transport to 
and from International centers and national power facilities would 
increase. Technical anti-theft measures suoh as spiking or denaturing 
would pose a challenge to subnational groups, but not necessarily to a 
state which has adopted a weapons route.
Before internationalization oould possibly be implemented many 
political and economic Issues would have to be resolved. Questions suoh
29
as where facilities should be located, who will operate them, and who 
will be ellgble to receive their services require difficult value 
judgements and concessions* Integration of individual fuel systems into 
a multilateral body requires each member to relinquish a portion of Its 
national sovereignty by giving up its Independent control over domestic 
energy sources* In some cases, however, state acoess to assured fuel 
supplies will actually be enhanced* Internationalization is a long term 
goal which can perhaps be best implemented incrementally, using
intermediary measures such as regional facilities.
Despite these technical constraints, some states will still 
overcome the resoroe and engineering obstacles of a weapons program* In 
these oases, additional measures aimed at derailing a state's political 
or seourity motives for "going nuclear" will have to be adopted*
The Nature of Proliferation Incentives
According to the Congressional Researah Center there are at least 
twenty-three non-nuclear weapon states with the potential capacity to
CQ
produce HEU or plutonium. Despite this capability the floodgates of
the nuolear regime have hardly come crashing open. Indeed, the rate of 
proliferation has been maintained at a triokle, averaging one new member 
per eight y e a r s P o l i t i c a l  probabilities and consequences have 
mediated the forecasted rush towards nuolear acquisition* Nonetheless, 
several nonweapons states oan be considered nuclear aspirants* To 
comprehend these states' nuclear incentives, it is Imperative to 
understand the perceptual differences between nuolear haves and 
have-nots as to the utility of nuolear weapons*
Literature debating the dejireability of nuclear weapons is for 
the most part presented from a western point of view. Such a
perspective typically emphasizes the llkliehood of nuclear war as an 
increasing function either of the "n-th country" problem^^ or the
Co
unpredictable behavior of "irrational" state leaders. These critics 
point out embryonic systems would be highly vulnerable to OsIrak style 
attaok, internal sabotage* or an accidental detonation. Regardless of 
the increased security risks involved* Third World states would be 
foolish to attempt a weapons program given the high economic costs suoh 
a venture would entail.^
All of these faotors are indeed considerations to be reckoned with. 
The point here is that the bottom line number of a developing nation's 
security calculus Is more likely to be positive in favor of nuelear 
acquisition* than is a western analyst's estimate for the same problem. 
There are several reasons for this difference of opinion. One is the 
hypocritical attitude of the superpowers* who verbally downplay the 
Importance of the weapons* yet oontinue to expend great quantities of 
resources in pursuit of "modernized and better" arsenals.
Historical precedent also dictates importance to the possessors of 
nuclear weapons. Britain and Prance have both held key positions in 
Western security* and have reaped the financial and technical rewards of 
suoh an alliance. Per China* the nuolear quest initially meant a loss 
of Soviet technological support* but the gamble has paid off in the long 
term by oreatlng greater cooperation with the United States. India was 
also initially Isolated following its nuolear test* but the Reagan 
administration has made efforts to increase Indian reliance on U.3.
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cooperation and materials. In terms of international political clout It 
may be pointed out that all five permanent members of the United 
Nations' Security Counoil (UNSC) are the five declared nuclear powers. 
Finallyi an important lesson can be drawn from the Japanese experiences 
at Hiroshima and Nagasakit the first and only victim of a nuclear attack 
did not possess an atomic capability itself.
A second point of divergence in the haves and have-nots' nuclear
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value perceptions is on military security gains. Several of the 
aurrent nuclear aspirants (Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, 
and Taiwan) are considered international "pariahs." As such they face 
aoute security dilemmas created by regional hostilities, internal 
disparities, or a combination of both. Their Insecurity is further 
exaoerbated by questionable territorial boundaries, origins, or regime 
legitimacy| as well as international ostraolsm for moral, soolal, or 
political reasons (ie. human rights violations or racist policies)# 
Their sovereignty is dependent upon the extent to which they oan force 
other states to respect their existence. By acquiring nuclear weapons, 
pariah states oan hope to deter a potential aggressor, quell domestic 
opposition, supplement inferior conventional foroes, and to attraot 
super- or great power military support or alliance guarantees by 
threatening to "go nuclear" if such aid Is not provided.
Some western analysts also state that nuclear war-fighting utility 
would be negllgble in a Third World setting, because a wide population 
dispersal reduces the number of targets."Quite the contrary situation 
existst a decrease in the number of major cities within a given country 
increases the value of large targets that are present. Industrial and
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military facilities tend to be centralized, and a few well planned 
attacks could anhilate an adversary's capability and will to continue a 
conflict.
These prestige and security motives may be summarized in a simple 
two-class typology. Prestige-seekers are typioally second order states 
which do not confront a severe security threat. While they face varying 
levels of economic or military dependency upon a superpower, they still 
enjoy a relative degree of political lndependece. By acquiring nuclear 
weapons (or by threatening such an acquisition) their main goal is to 
attract or increase existing regional and international recognition. A 
weak or nonexistent superpower presence may encourage aspirants to 
become a dominant regional power. International acknowledgement of this 
new position may in turn generate fresh economic and political benefits. 
For these states actual usage would not have to be a feasible 
consideration, but nuclear weapons would be regarded in the same light 
as Charles de Gaulle's "force de frappes" an ultimate deterrent to 
aggression which would simultaneously grant its holder an equal voice in 
the international system.
States with security-related motives are also seeking a nuclear 
equalizer, yet for them deterrence (rather than political or economio 
gains) is the primary incentive to gain nuclear status. These states 
generally faoe a conventional or nuclear military threat from a 
superpower or a neighboring country. Often they are small geographical 
entitles (oompact strategic targets) which lack the internal resources 
necessary to defend themselves, and consequently they are dependent upon 
an outside source for their survival. This vulnerability leaves them
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little bargaining power in International affairs. In addition to these 
external challenges, security-seekers may face internal opposition 
expressed in demands for re^* 1 autonomy or secession.
Demand-Side Policy Options
Demand-side policies focus on reducing a state's incentive to 
acquire a weapons capability. In accordance with the analysis above, 
this means addressing the near-nuclears' security concerns and 
international ambitions. Prestige is a fuzzy concept in International 
relations theory, and beoause its end goal is so difficult to define, it 
Is easier to satisfy. Prestige may mean a seat at international or 
regional negotiations, a new trade agreement, a diplomatic exohange, or 
any number of actions which signify recognition. Prestige may also be 
interpreted as the degree to which a state is able function free of 
external influence in the international community. Security concerns 
are more precise and likely to require concrete solutions. Therefore, 
polioy options may become limited, and concerns more difficult to 
appease•
Assured Fuel Supplies
The Internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle (discussed 
above) would supposedly provide countries with ample amounts of nuclear 
reactor fuel, yet these states would still be dependent upon the 
political good will of others' to meet their energy needs. One way to 
alleviate these ooncerns of potential resource or servioe out-offs is by 
allowing national nuclear stockpiles. Qranted fuel for a ten year
period, a state would have sufficient time either to resolve a crisis 
situation, or to develop its own enrichment or reprocessing facilities 
if it were to be cut from international supplies* This reassurance 
would require increased safeguarding and security to proteot stockpiled 
materials from diversion or terrorist sabotage* Hopefully a spirit of 
mutual trust would rise as international energy cooperation Increased, 
and these stockpiles could either be reduced or eliminated altogether*
A second assuranoe would be to Increase the ability of current 
suppliers to provide nuclear-related services* Such an Increase (which 
may or may not then 1 1% dormant) could then allow dependent parties to 
buttress their supply lines through cross-guarantees or back-up 
agreements. An added benefit of this approach would be the oreation of 
a "buyer's market," which would ultimately keep energy costs down* By 
being assured cheap and plentiful fuel supplies, a state may be 
convinced to avoid developing proliferation-sensitive enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities*
Nuclear De-Baphasls
A critical factor in nonweapons states' perception of nuclear 
utility is the superpower arms race* Although the U*S* and tl.S.S.B* 
verbally downplay the role of nuclear weapons in International polltlos, 
both parties harp continuously on "maintaining strategic parity," and 
both continue to pursue newer and better atomic arsenals to oredibly 
back their nuclear doctrines* These pursuits ignore the superpowers' 
commitments under article X of the NPT, in which each pledged to 
sincerely negotiate meaningful arms control measures to halt vertical
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proliferation. Violation of the often cited cornerstone of 
nonproliferation efforts highlights the esteem with which American and 
Soviets alike regard nuclear weapons.
The U.S can best avert this hypocrisy by living up to Its Treaty 
obligations. Failing this approach, the U.S. could stress other
elements of national power (ie. political will, economic strength, or 
conventional military armaments). Unfortunately, pledges such as "no 
first useH carry ripple effeots which negatively Impact the NATO allies, 
and nonproliferation policy must be subordinated to another interest... 
western solidarity.
Increased Disincentives
If a potential proliferator cannot be convinced that weapons 
acquisition will not bring it value, perhaps it oan be convinced that 
that value will be outweighed by penalties it will incur by going 
nuclear. An exceptional example of reprisal for straying too far from 
the accepted nuclear boundaries was the 1961 Israeli pre-emptive attack 
on Iraq's Osirak reactor. A second form of military disincentives is 
the extension of aid to a nuclear aspirant's adversary. The more common 
punitive aotion undertaken, however, is the imposition of political or 
economic sanctions.
Sanctions can range from the mildest form of protest to the extreme
of withdrawing from an alliance agreement or suspending military 
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assistance. The success or failure of sanctions relies heavily upon 
the credibility that the threat will be oarried out, international 
cooperation in administering the punishment, and in a state's own 
indigenous economic and military capacity to withstand external
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pressure*
U.S. legislated sanctions flourished Immediately after the 1974
Indian PNB* Notable among these documents were the Syamington and Glenn
amraendments (requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards on all U.S.
enrichment exports), the Export-Import Bank Act (restricting financial
assistance to countries engaged in suspicoua nuclear activities), and
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the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (described above)* These actions 
were supplemented by the multilateral efforts such as the London 
Suppliers* Group and the stricter guidelines recommended by the NPT's 
Zangger Committee.
Security Guarantees^
Security guarantees cover a wide gambit of options, which are then 
reduced by the nature of a recipient state's domestic politics, regional 
role, conventional capabilities and alliance structures. Alternatives 
Include verbally guaranteeing conventional assistance In case of 
aggression, tacitly "extending the nuclear umbrella," providing 
nonmilitary aid to strengthen domestic institutions, entering formal 
alliances, providing military assistance either in the form of arms 
sales and transfers or the actual stationing of troops, and basing 
nuclear weapons on another country's territory. Factors raediat'ng the 
policy options adopted include U*S* willingness to extend a particular 
type of aid, as well as the recipient country's willingness to accept 
it.
Conflict Reduction
Military and economic aid merely strengthen an ally against an external 
threat, but disputes remain* External threats can be elutnated
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forcefully, or preferably, by the relaxation of tension. This can be 
done by encouraging regional dialogue, and then regional cooperation. 
Supplemental measures may buy time for this method to succeed. In
addition, the establishment of nuclear free zones (NFZ) might eliminate
a major source of mistrust and fear, thereby facilitating cooperation.
U.S. Nonproliferation Policy
Contending Theories
There are three basic approaches one can take towards
proliferation: pro, con, or neut^il. * Proliferation proponents envision
a world in which nuclear powers, responsible for their fates as well as
others', will forego conventional war to avoid the risk of escalation to 
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a nuclear war. One could argue that the possession of nuclear weapons
by regional powers will eliminate proxy wars and foroe the superpowers
to "achieve nuclear maturity and to show this by behaving
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sensibly." Gaulllsts would argue that a nuclear weapons capability 
equalizes a nation's participation in the international community, both 
politically and economically.
These Hobbesian views represent total abandonment of hope for a
future world order based on common Interests and mutual values. They
are truly realist in Identifying each country's survival as its own
primary concern, yet slokenlngly fatalistic for international peace and
stability. Disregarding the vulnerability of a nuolear system in its
transition from an embryonic to a fully-deployed force (pre-emptive
strikes or terrorist hijackings) such thinking forsees the emergence of
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a stable "unit veto" system. In such a system war is unthinkable
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because all states live In respect (fear) of the others' nuclear 
capabilities, or by the "negative golden rule of natural law by not 
doing to others what he would not have done to hi*."7* This system 
supposedly remains stable despite the absence of secure command, 
control, communication and Information (CJ I), assured second-strike 
capabilities, and rational actors. It falls to address the increased 
possibility of an accidental launoh, and disregards the idea of a 
suicidal national leader or factional group which might actually begin a 
nuclear engagement.
Advocates of neutrality or nonaction either tacitly agree that
gradual proliferation is a good thing, or have resigned themselves to
the inevitability of its occurrence. Such nonohalanoe will leave
tomorrow's leaders to deal with a world of increased nuolear threats.
A third group of proliferation theorists accept the the weapons
spread as Inevitable, and they emphasise proliferation management to
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mitigate the risks of accidental or catalytic war. If the United
States oannot halt proliferation, it is at least in Its Interest to
minimise the acquisition rate, thereby allowing time for the
international community to absorb the new weapons states with as little
destabilising effects as possible. In a world of nuolear armed states,
the weapons themselves are not a challenge to the absence of military
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conflict, but rather possible deterrenoe breakdown is the threat. It 
would then be in U.S. best interests to extend assistance for
developing secure I and anti-theft measures. A problem arises in
determining when such aid should be offered. If a watermark is dearly 
demarcated at which a state becomes eligible for nuolear assistance, the
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policy could have the negative effect of encouraging states to strive 
for this level*
A subgroup of this mitigation school of thought argues for a 
controlled rate of proliferation! not because the U.S. cannot control 
it alone, but because they recognise that nonproliferation policy is 
only one component of a broader U.S. foreign policy.' In a region the 
U.S. deems vital for political or military reasons9 it may have to 
tolerate the near-nuclear status of an ally (le. Israel or Pakistan) 
which face a severe security threat.
There are at least two factors which are detrimental to U.S. 
foreign policy objectives* rising international Instability and a 
decreased ability to project Amerioan power. By advocating selective 
proliferation a value judgement is made between these two variables. If 
the U.S. disassociated Itself from any state which was suspeoted of 
pursuing a nuclear arsenal9 it would lose footholds in several critical 
regions. Furthermore! withdrawing economic, political9 or military aid 
may spur a country to reveal its hitherto covert arsenal, thus 
instigating a pre-emptive attack or regional arms race. On the other 
hand, U.S. tolerance of limited nuolear activities may actually enhanoe 
both regional stability and (through a proxy) U.S. power projection 
capabilities.
A fourth school of thought is the staunch 
anti-proliferationists.^ Proponents of this stance cling stubbornly to 
the belief that the U.S. can prevent proliferation by witholding 
sensitive technologies and resources. Attempts at "constructive
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engagement” through nuolear deals are abhorrent and should be avoided. 
If a state receives assistance from another source and then decides to 
pursue a weapons program, at least the American conscience will be 
clear.
Summary; Policy Implications
Theoretically the best nonprolilferation policy the U.S. could 
implement would be to deny any other state the physical ability to 
create a nuclear arsenal. As argued above, this goal is an ideal which 
cannot be reached. New efforts must now be directed at maltalnlng the 
technical barriers which remain, and at comprehending the incentives 
which drive a state to seek a weapons capability. The ohoice and 
suooess of U.S. policy options are shaped not only by the technical 
level of development and nature of a nuclear aspirant, but by U.S. 
capablitles and its assessment of other overlapping Interests whoh may 
conflict with nonproliferation efforts. Although at the macro-level 
U.S. policy should remain a uniform anti-proliferation stance, this 
policy will have to be enacted on a case-by-case basis, and in 
accordance with the means most sufficient to undercut a given country's 
nuclear ambitions. Only by understanding American options relative to 
the nature of a targeted state's character oan workable policies be 
formulated•
Some general guidelines to steer U.S. nonproliferation polioy oan 
be distinguished. Foremost among these is reinforcing international 
cooperative efforts. This means participating in multilateral treaties
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and agenciesi shaping unilateral measures to supplement International 
efforts9 and readdressing Its own global role*
International agreements are now In effeot9 but need to be 
strengthened. At a minimum, the transfer of nuclear resources and 
taetiologies should be acoompanled by a comprehensive safeguard agreemet 
with no clause for termination. Built In biases, such as the differing 
inspection standsrs demanded of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states 
under the HPT, should be eliminated. While the U.S. and Soviet Union 
have gradually allowed greater monitoring of their nuolear facilities, 
full inspection terms are a long way off. In light of this reality, new 
vehicles for global nuclear cooperatio need to be constructed.
New international bodies should be designed not as comprehensive In 
nature, but to encompass as broad a scope of participants as possible. 
After consensus has been reached on minimal points, hopefully trust will 
begin to build and more difficult problems can be addressed. Also, by 
including viMl non-NPT signatories such as Argentina, Brazil, India and 
the PRC, nonproliferation advocates will be acknowledging both the 
International status of these countries, and a nation's right to pursue 
nuclear development for peaceful applications. Inclusion of such states 
will shift the nuolear burden to a balance between the current 
Industrialized nations and the emerging regional powers. This new 
responsibility as a role model should influence a country's (le. India) 
borderline activities between peaceful and military uses. Burden 
sharing will also help to eliminate perceptions of imperialist attempts 
by "developed" nations to maintain a nuclear monopoly ove* other 
nations. Since nuolear countries can no longer completely contain
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technology flows, it is better to move slowly to a cooperative
trickle-down posture and create a stronger nonweapons-prollferation 
international norm*
Currently U.S* unilateral measures, such as the NNPA, run contrary 
to an international norm of nuclear sharing* Such legislation ranks 
next to controversial issues like the MX and Pershing-2 missiles in 
terms of potential politioization* Proliferation is an issue which is 
rarely deeply scrutinized by the public, and which carries great
emotional appeal. A one-man Congressional campaign to bottle the 
nuclear genie can gain strong support from constituents, while ignoring 
the International backlash it creates abroad. U.S* policy options are 
further inhibited by lengthy Congressional debates, causing doubt as to 
U.S. ability to function as a reliable nuclear partner* For these 
reasons, the U.S. should begin to ammend or repeal Its nuclear
transfer legislation. Oversight standards such as full safeguarding 
must be maintained, but there is room to ease actual transfer
restrictions.
The above suggestion does not mean the U.S* should not 
discriminate between friends and foes in nuclear association* There is 
a significant difference between a nuclear oapable India nd a nuclear 
capable Iraq or Libya* Here the rise of regional nuolear agents again 
comes into play* These powers, having accepted an international norm, 
can be used to police their rebellious neighbors. International 
reaction to the Israeli attack at Osirak suggests that punitive actions 
would not be severely condemned, and if administered for the sake of a 
near-global value, it may actually be tacitly approved of* The same
*13
action by an independent or Joint superpower effort would receive strong 
international criticism.
Finally, the U.S. must redress its own international role. By 
asking others to forego the nuclear option, Americans are asking them to 
relinquish a piece of their sovereignty. Such a sacrifice must be 
respected, and the U.S. must therefore work for a global order based on 
mutual understanding and not military force. At the least, efforts 
should be made to channel hostile and militaristic tones into m^re 
healthy economic or political competition. This includes a renewed 
commitment to the spirit of the NPT and a halv to vertical
proliferation. The superpowers cannot preach nuclear morality and deny 
the prestige value of armaments while constantly Increasing their own 
nuclear arsenals. The extent to which the United States and the Soviet 
Union can live up to the standards they impose upon other countries, is 
perhaps the extent to which nuclear weapons proliferation can be 
avoided.
Conclusions
In proliferation, as in any policy-planning situation, values must 
be weighed and priorities established. "There is no free lunoh in 
nonproliferation policy$ every effective measure has economic, political 
or moral prioe tags."^ This means that where nonproliferation and other 
concerns dash, the U.S. will have to make difficult policy ohoioes. 
In some oases the level of teohnioal development and the inoentives of a 
near-nuclear country, as well as the lack of an International oonsensus, 
may so limit U.S. ability to aot that the choioe will be made for it.
In different incidences> other U.S. goals nay take priority and 
nonproliferation policy will be subordinated to other concerns.
At a macro-levelt however, U.S. Interests are still bent served by 
an anti-proliferation stance. While political leaders may seemingly 
ignore Israeli, or Pakistani, or other covert nuclear activities, even 
their silence carries a message. There is a subtle difference between 
tolerance for a situation one cannot change and tacit approval of the 
same. This thin line alone may inhibit the programs of some nuclear 
aspirants.
The time when a cap on technology and/or resources may have 
prevented nuclear proliferation from occurring has passed. With the 
rise of Canadian, guropean, and Soviet sales of nuclear services and 
technologies (and now even a third-tier of supplier states such as 
India, Israel, Brazil and Taiwan), even U.S. control over "peaceful" 
nuclear activities has disappeared. Emphasis must now be place on 
international cooperation to reduce the technical aspects of the 
proliferation risk.
The U.S. still maintains unilateral freedom of movement in 
decreasing the political incentives to proliferate. Again, however, 
U.S. interest is best served through the promotion of international 
cooperation and stability. In many cases, multilateral and Independent 
U.S. efforts merely buy time in which trust can be fostered. Fatalists 
and critics of such policies should note the success which time has 
bought in recent yearst American economic and security cooperation with 
South Korea and Taiwan has seemingly quelled their nuclear ambitions$
the Israeli boob has remained In the basement $ and the Soviet Invasion 
of Afghanistan has laid the ground for a possible Indo-Pakiatani 
rapproaohment, thus possibly averting the most likely regional arms 
race.
On closer examination. President Reagan's "subtle tolerance for 
selective proliferation" can be seen as a policy which recognizes the 
universal nature of the proliferation problem. Technically Nr. Reagan 
has not undermined any of the country's laws, and his bypassing of 
Congress on the sale of Indian-bound uranium to France has perhaps 
highlighted the degree to which over-legislation cramps American ability 
to act in the international arena. Nonetheless, such tactics should not 
be continued. It would be better for the U.S. to repeal or amend its 
nonproliferation legislation, rather than gradually eroding the 
face-value of its anti-proliferation stance. These measures would 
increase the reliability and predictability of U.S. decision-makers in 
the eyes of other state leaders, thereby facilitating International 
cooperation.
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1. This position is backed by olaims that soiss near-nuolear countries 
might be more likely to launch a nuolear attack either because they 
have less to lose (politically and militarily), or because they are 
controlled by "irrational* leaders. Other theorists olte the 
Increased numerical probabilities of accidental or catalytic ear. 
A sub-school of the anti-proliferation theorists foouses upon 
varying rates of proliferation! and hoe the increased likltehood of 
war fluctuates with the pace of nudear acquisition. These 
arguments are developed more fully In the below disaussion on U.S. 
interests in preventing proliferation.
?• this voice, which oomes mainly from near-nuclear and regional 
powers, is not new in the debate, but rather it is louder and draws 
more attention. See the below section on U.S. interests in 
preventing proliferation.
3. William C. Potter, Nuolear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, 
Massachusettss Oelgeschlager, Qunn and Haim, Publishers, Inc., 
1982), p. 37.
4. Ibid., p. 36.
5• Ibid., p. 40.
6. For an overview of American, British, French, Soviet, and Vest 
German views on multi-lateral nulear forces in Europe during the 
1960#s, see Wolfram F. Hanreider and Uraeme P. Auton, The Foreign
of West Germany, Franoo. and Britain (New Jersey1 Prentice 
., 19557, pp. 13-15, 107, 200-202.
7. A brief summary of the NPT is provided in U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 
(Washington, D.C.t U.S. Government Printing Offloe, 1982), p.off.
— prevent the spread of nulear weapons (Articles 1 and II)| 
— provide assurance, through International safeguards, that the 
peaceful nuclear activities of states whioh have not already 
developed nuolear weapons will not be diverted to making such 
weapons (Article XXX)|
— promote, to the maximum extent consistent with the other purposes 
of the Treaty, the peaoeful uses of nuolear energy through full 
cooperation—  with the potential benefits of any peaceful 
application of nuolear explosion technology being made available to 
non-nuolear parties under appropriate international observation 
(Article IV and V);
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— express the determination of the parties that the Treaty should 
lead to further progress In comprehensive arms oontrol and nuclear 
disarmament measures (Article VI),
8. Ann Florini, Nuolear feoUferaUon (New York: United Nations
Association of America, Inc,, 19^37, pp. *2-34.
9. Ashok Kapur, "Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and National
Security," in Robert Boardman and .lames F. Keeley (eds.), Nuclear 
Exports and World Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983)7 
p. T?9. ~ —
10. Florlni, op. cit.
11. Coi* D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds.), International Arms 
Control (California: Stanford University Press, f9?47,~ pp. 
7£2-f64\
12. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Of floe, T 982), p.™94TArtiole X).
13* The Group's guidelines have since been adopted by Belgium, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Czeohoslavakia, East Germany, 
Poland, Australia, and Finland) Leonard S. Spector, Nuolear 
Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 450.
14. Ibid., pp. 448-451.
15. Before nuclear goods are transferred the agreement requires
recipient states to: pledge the goods will he used for peaceful
applications only) aooept international safeguards with no 
provisions for termination) provide security for all nuolear goods 
and fallities to prevent diversion or sabotage) and agree not to 
transfer the goods to a third party unless the new recipient 
country agrees to the above code of conduct, and then only with the 
express permission of the original supplier country. In addition, 
the Supplier's agreed to exarolse rsestraint in exporting certain 
technologies, and to work towards internationalizing the nuolear 
fuel cycle. Speotor, op* cit., p.448.
16. Potter, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
17. Kapur, op. cit., pp. 170-171.
18. Ted Greenwood, George W« RathJens and Jack Ruina, "Nuolear Power 
and Weapons Proliferation," Adelphl racer, no. 130 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 22.
19. A speolfic case is India, which now receives fuel for its Taupur 
power plants from France, through U.S. efforts. Speotor, op. 
cit •1 p. 40.
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20. William Proxmire, "Congress Must Act on Proliferation," Bulletin of 
the Atonic Scientists, vol. 41, no. 3 (Maroh 1985), p. 32.
21. This seotion is drawn from Greenwood et al., op* oit.; Potter, op.
oit., pp.59-98; and Speotor, op. oit., pp. 426-433.
22. Speotor cites a sphere-shaped critical mass of plutonium as 5 to 8
kilograms (11 to 17.6 pounds) and highly enriched uranium as 15 to
25 kilograms (33 to 55 pounds), p. 432.
23. Using shielding techniques oritloal mass can be roduoed to 4 to 5 
kilograms U-233 and Pu-239, and 11 kilograms U-235; Potter, op. 
oit., p. 61.
24. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
25. Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas A. Brown, Gregory Jones et al., Swords 
from Plowshares (Chicago! The University of Chioago Press, 1979), 
p. *33•
26. Potter, op. oit., pp. 69-80.
27. Greenwood et al*, op. oit., pp. 6-7.
28. Ibid., p. 031.
29. Potter, op. oit., pp. 72, 76-77 .
30. Ibid., p. 76.
31. Greenwood et al., op. clt., p. 26.
32. Potter, op. Qit., P« 76.
33. Speotor, op. oit., p. 309.
3b. Greenwood et al., op. olt», pp. 23, 28.
35. Potter, op. clt., p. 74.
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37. Blacker and Duffy, op. clt, p. 16b.
38. Potter, op. oit., pp. 7U-75.
39. Ibid.> pp. i67-69.
40. Ibid., p. 63.
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Safeguards (New Yorks Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 159) oited In 
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43. Greenwood et al., op. olt., p. 14.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 15.
46. Ibid.
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Seymour N. Hersh, " A Pakistani Tried to Send Trigger for A-Bomb 
Home," New York Times (February 25, 1985), pp. 1, 6.
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57. A detailed plan for comprehensive Internationalisation is outlined
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Spread of Nuolear Weapons (London s Taylor and Pranofa, UdT, 198o F j
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